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FmuCIARY AnMINISTRATION-ExEcuTORS AND AnMINISTRATORs-DEATH OF

widow survived her
husband by three months and thirteen days. Subsequent to the death of both,
appra~sers of the husband's estate set off to his widow $750 as her year's allowance.1 Executrix of the widow's estate filed an exception to the allowance and
made application to increase the amount on the ground that the sum given
would have been insufficient if the widow had lived the full year. Granting the
application, the probate court found that a reasonable allowance based on twelve
months would be $5000, The court of appeals reversed, holding that the allowance should be based on the three month period during which the widow lived.2
On certification, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The widow's estate was
entitled to an amount computed on the full twelve month period. In re Estate
of Croke: Clancy v. Cleveland Trust Co.p 155 Ohio 434, 99 N.E. (2d) 483
(1951).
Statutes in most jurisdictions have been designed to meet the needs of the
widow during the pendency of administration of the deceased's estate. Although
varying in detail,3 these statutes are of two general forms: (1) an award may
or may not be permitted, at the discretion' of the probate court or other body,
and (2) an award, but not necessarily the amount, is mandatory. Where statutes
Wmow AS AFFECTING AMouN-r OF HER ALLOWANCE-A

1 Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1948) §10509-74. "The appraisers also shall set off and
allow to the widow •.. sufficient provisions or other property to support (her) for twelve
months from the decedent's death ...."
2 Croke's Estate v. Clancy, (Ohio App. 1950) 93 N.E. (2d) 799.
8 See 21 AM. Jun., Executors and Administrators §314; and 144 A.L.R. 270 (1943).
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of the former type are in force, 4 no problem arises as to amount if no allowance
has been made prior to the widow's death. The courts consider either that the
right to an award does not vest until the award is made by the proper triburral,
or that the right to an award is personal and abates with the widow's death. 5
However, under a statute of the latter type6 the right is said to vest immediately
upon the death of the spouse and is not personal to the widow.7 Heretofore, no
question seems to have been raised in the latter jurisdictions as to whether the
amount vesting is the full allowance for the statutory period if the widow dies
before any amount is set off, although two courts have discussed the matter by
way of dictum. In a Georgia case the court declared that the administrator of
the widow's estate could make application for the widow's allowance, and that
the amount was to be set aside "under the same rules and regulations as would
apply in case the widow were alive, and the application had been made by her.''8
A Missouri case suggests that, even if the widow had lived only one day longer
than her spouse, her estate would be entitled to the entire twelve months' allowance.9 An Iowa case10 has been cited11 erroneously as a slight variation of the
4 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §1476. "In addition to the awards
provided for, the court may make such further reasonable allowance of cash out of the
estate as may be necessary for the maintenance of the family according to their circumstances." Similar are Vt. Stat. (1947) §3021; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §2.
5 See State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 23 Wash. (2d) 250, 160 P. (2d) 606
(1945). Perhaps what the courts mean when they speak of "vesting" is that the widow's
being alive at the time of the tribunal's action is a condition precedent to the creation of
any right to an award. It should be noted that this approach alone does not solve the
question as to whether the right that does vest upon the tribunal's action is a personal right.
Where the widow dies after the tribunal makes the award but before she receives all or a
part of the payments, the personal right analysis must necessarily be invoked to preclude
the receiving of the remainder of the payments by the widow's estate. Adams v. Adams,
10 Met. (51 Mass.) 170 (1845). Under the mandatory statutes, the vesting requirement
is fulfilled automatically on the death of the husband; no personal right analysis appears
to be applied. Dorah v. Dorah, 4 Ohio 292 (1854).
6 Ga. Code Ann. (1935) §113-1002: " ••. Upon the death of any person ... leaving a
widow • • • it shall be the duty of the ordinary . • . to appoint five discreet appraisers; and
it shall be the duty of such appraisers .•. to set apart and assign to such widow • • • either
in property or money, a sufficiency from the estate for [her] support and maintenance for
a space of 12 months from the date of administration, •.. to be estimated according to the
circumstances and standing of the family previous to the death of the testator or intestate•..•"
7 Brown v. Joiner, 77 Ga. 232 (1886).
Bid. at 234.
9 Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo. App. 91, 89 S.W. (2d) 153 (1936). However, the statute construed in that case has been revised. It appears that some specific
personal property now vests immediately, but no further monetary allowance vests until
action is taken by the court. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) §§106, 107, with Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1949) §462.450. One day's survival would not entitle the widow to a year's allowance under Ohio law. See Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1948) §10503-18.
10 In re Estate of Rice, 146 Iowa 48 at 50, 124 N.W. 792 (1910).
1120 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 134 (1951). The dictum in this case does not deal with
the facts in which the widow has died prior to the awarding of the allowance. Iowa Code
(1946) §635.12, is a discretionary statute. No property vests until the award is made.
Zunkel v. Colson, 109 Iowa 695, 81 N.W. 175 (1899).
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same position. In the principal case the majority of the court relies on two arguments: (I) the sweeping and mandatory language of the statute12 admits of no
exception pertinent here and does not require that the widow have need of the
support, and (2) the right vests in the widow immediately upon death of the
husband, so the quantity of the award is to be determined only by facts existing
at the death of the husband. It is submitted that these arguments are supportable. However, the further suggestion by the court that the allowance must
necessarily contemplate either support for twelve months in life or support for
a portion of the twelve months plus funeral expenses can hardly be taken literally. The latter alternative would be highly impractical because of the difficulty of contemplating by foresight what portion of the year the widow would
live, whereas viewing the matter by hindsight would be precluded by the court's
previous argument that no facts subsequent to the husband's death may be considered. The holding of the case, however, appears to be consistent with the
desirable policy of construing the statute most favorably for the widow. It prevents temptations that might cause delay in awarding the amount. It removes
hesitation of a widow's creditors in extending her credit on more than a day-today basis, for they can feel assured that if she dies before any award is set off
to her, the award will be sufficient to pay a year's requirements. Security for a
widow during whatever period she lives within that year is thus assured.18
Warren K. Urbom

12 See note 1
18 The same

supra.
holding would almost necessarily be reached in Georgia because of its
express statutory requirement (see note 6 supra) that the amount be estimated in accordance with circumstances existing previous to the death of the husband.

